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Abstract—Memory consistency models (MCMs) specify the
legal ordering and visibility of shared memory accesses in a
parallel program. Traditionally, instruction set architecture (ISA)
MCMs assume that relevant program-visible memory ordering
behaviors only result from shared memory interactions that take
place between user-level program instructions. This assumption
fails to account for virtual memory (VM) implementations that
may result in additional shared memory interactions between
user-level program instructions and both 1) system-level opera-
tions (e.g., address remappings and translation lookaside buffer
invalidations initiated by system calls) and 2) hardware-level
operations (e.g., hardware page table walks and dirty bit updates)
during a user-level program’s execution. These additional shared
memory interactions can impact the observable memory ordering
behaviors of user-level programs. Thus, memory transistency
models (MTMs) have been coined as a superset of MCMs to
additionally articulate VM-aware consistency rules. However, no
prior work has enabled formal MTM specifications, nor methods
to support their automated analysis.
To fill the above gap, this paper presents the TransForm
framework. First, TransForm features an axiomatic vocabulary
for formally specifying MTMs. Second, TransForm includes a
synthesis engine to support the automated generation of litmus
tests enhanced with MTM features (i.e., enhanced litmus tests, or
ELTs) when supplied with a TransForm MTM specification. As
a case study, we formally define an estimated MTM for Intel x86
processors, called x86t elt, that is based on observations made
by an ELT-based evaluation of an Intel x86 MTM implementation
from prior work and available public documentation [23, 29].
Given x86t elt and a synthesis bound (on program size) as
input, TransForm’s synthesis engine successfully produces a
complete set of ELTs (for synthesis bounds that complete within
one week) including relevant hand-curated ELTs from prior work,
plus over 100 more.
Index Terms—memory transistency, memory consistency, en-
hanced litmus tests, synthesis, axiomatic modeling
I. INTRODUCTION
Programmers and system designers rely on interface specifi-
cations to coordinate software’s correct execution on hardware
systems. For example, instruction set architectures (ISAs)
feature memory consistency models (MCMs) which specify
the legal orderings and visibility of shared memory accesses
in any parallel program running on an implementation of
the ISA. Defining behavior as fundamental as what value
can be returned when software loads from memory, both
under-specified and incorrectly implemented ISA MCMs have
resulted in a range of bugs in real-world programs [5, 7, 18,
53], and significant effort is devoted to specifying them and
∗The first two authors contributed equally to this paper.
Fig. 1: TransForm features 1) an axiomatic vocabulary for
specifying MTMs and 2) a synthesis engine for generating
ELTs from MTM specifications.
verifying their correct implementation [28, 29, 33–35, 53].
However, this paper addresses the observation that traditional
ISA MCMs fail to capture relevant shared memory interactions
and therefore relevant memory ordering behaviors [29].
Transistency: MCMs assume that program-visible memory
ordering behaviors only result from shared memory inter-
actions that take place between user-level program instruc-
tions. Thus, MCMs abstract away processor virtual memory
(VM) implementations that may result in additional shared
memory interactions between user-level program instructions
and both 1) system-level operations (e.g., address remappings
and translation lookaside buffer, or TLB, invalidations initi-
ated by system calls) and 2) hardware-level operations (e.g.,
hardware page table walks and dirty bit updates) during a
user-level program’s execution [47, 48]. Along with involving
non-user-facing instructions, these additional shared memory
interactions take place via shared memory state that is typi-
cally outside the purview of MCMs. This transistency state
includes 1) page table entries (PTEs) which store virtual-to-
physical address (VA-to-PA) mappings that are modifiable by
the operating system (OS) and PTE status bits (e.g., dirty
bits) that are modifiable directly by hardware, and 2) TLB
entries which cache VA-to-PA mappings on each core and
can be evicted by the OS via inter-processor interrupts (IPIs)
or loaded by hardware. VM-specific systems behaviors can
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negatively impact concurrent program executions [4, 5, 22,
51], so ISA-level event ordering specifications like MCMs
should include them. Failure to incorporate VM-aware features
into ISA MCM specifications and subsequent hardware MCM
verification implicitly makes the erroneous assumption that
underlying VM implementations will not negatively impact
program correctness.
To augment MCMs with VM-aware features, prior work
proposed memory transistency models (MTMs): “the superset
of [memory] consistency [models] which capture all [address]
translation-aware sets of ordering rules” [29]. Likewise, where
ISA MCM behaviors are typically specified and validated
using small diagnostic programs called litmus tests (such as sb
in Fig. 2a) [2, 3, 5, 19, 23, 30, 31], MTMs use enhanced litmus
tests (ELTs) as a mechanism for encoding and testing the
effects of VM operations on parallel program execution. ELTs
are small parallel programs, comprised not just of user-facing
ISA-level events (i.e., ISA instructions or micro-ops), but also
of system- and hardware-level events that execute on behalf
of or interleaved with user-facing instructions. Figs. 2b and 2c
(explained in §II-B) give examples of ELTs, which, in contrast
to Fig. 2a’s standard MCM litmus test, include system- and
hardware-level operations that access program-visible tran-
sistency state. Unfortunately, no prior work has formally
defined MTMs, an essential step for enabling automated ELT
generation and thus ELT-based validation and verification of
MTM implementations. Furthermore, the ELTs of prior work
were largely hand-generated1, and therefore incomplete.
This paper presents the TransForm framework (short for
transistency formalized) to support the development of for-
mally specified MTMs, and to automate the synthesis of
ELTs to validate them. TransForm (Fig. 1) consists of 1) an
axiomatic vocabulary for formally defining arbitrary MTMs,
and 2) a synthesis engine for automatically generating ELTs
from ISA-level MTM specifications defined using the Trans-
Form vocabulary. TransForm’s axiomatic vocabulary extends
beyond the standard axiomatic MCM vocabulary [3, 9, 32,
37]. It provides new constructs for modeling MTM-specific
features such as particular VM-relevant shared memory state
and additional MTM-relevant system- and hardware-level op-
erations (i.e., transistency operations) that may interact with
user-facing program instructions via this additional state.
TransForm’s synthesis engine provides a mechanism to
automate ELT synthesis from axiomatic MTM specifications.
Together, formal MTMs and automated ELT synthesis support
the specification and subsequent verification and validation of
complex hardware-software event ordering scenarios. For ex-
ample, a bug in AMD Athlon™ 64 and Opteron™ processors
caused INVLPG instructions (the x86 instruction for evicting
a TLB entry, which is described further in §III-B2) to fail to
invalidate the designated TLB entries [4]. Such a bug, which
could be detected by TransForm-synthesized ELTs, can result
in the use of a stale address mapping.
1Prior work automates the insertion of ghost instructions (§III-A) into hand-
generated ELTs based on user-defined rules.
As a case study, we define x86t elt, an estimated2 MTM
for Intel x86 processors based on observations made by an
ELT-based evaluation of an Intel x86 MTM implementation
from prior work and available public documentation [23, 29].
We supply x86t elt as input to TransForm’s synthesis engine
to generate an ELT suite for evaluating the model’s efficacy.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
TransForm: We present the TransForm framework for for-
mally defining MTMs and synthesizing ELTs from MTM
specifications to support MTM verification and validation.
Axiomatic MTM vocabulary: To the best of our knowledge,
there have been no prior efforts to formally specify MTMs.
TransFrom augments MCMs with 1) transistency operations
and 2) relations for articulating shared memory interactions
between transistency operations and user-facing instructions.
ELT synthesis: TransForm automates ELT generation from
formal MTM specifications written in TransForm’s vocabulary.
The synthesized ELTs can be used to automate MTM verifi-
cation and validation and ultimately inform system designers
about the software-visible effects of VM implementations.
x86 case study: We define an estimated MTM for Intel
x86 processors, called x86t elt, based on publicly-available
documentation and prior ELT-based evaluation [23, 29]. Given
x86t elt, TransForm synthesizes all ELTs satisfying defined
criteria for minimality and stressing behaviors of the model.
TransForm’s synthesis engine successfully produces a com-
plete set of ELTs (for synthesis bounds that complete within
one week) including all relevant hand-curated ELTs from prior
work [29] plus over 100 more. This evaluation constitutes the
first automatically-synthesized and largest set of ELTs that can
be used for validating Intel x86 MTM implementations.
II. BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION
Since MCMs are a fundamental component for reasoning
about parallel program correctness, there has been significant
prior work on formally specifying them [3, 9, 11, 13, 36,
38–41, 43, 44, 55, 56]. Much of this work uses axiomatic-
style (i.e. declarative) specifications, which describe the legal
executions of a program with the help of logical axioms. These
axioms encode the conditions that must hold true during any
execution under the defined MCM. §II-A gives an overview of
axiomatic ISA MCM specifications and a standard vocabulary
for defining them. §II-B highlights the limitations of this
vocabulary for capturing MTM-relevant program behaviors.
§III extends the vocabulary in §II-A to incorporate transistency
operations.
A. Axiomatic Vocabulary for Specifying Memory Models
Two primary sets, referred to here as Event and Location,
can serve as the basis for defining ISA MCMs. Event is
the set of all micro-ops (typically memory and synchroniza-
tion operations) in a given program execution. Location
is the set of all memory locations. Referring to the store
2“Estimated” conveys that x86t elt is designed to comply with a suite
of hand-generated ELTs and available public documentation [23, 29] which
might be ambiguous, as pointed out in prior MCM work [15].
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C0 C1
W0 x = 1
R1 y = 2
W2 y = 2
R3 x = 1
po po
rf
rf
(a) User-level representation of the sb litmus test where the Reads
on cores C0 and C1 (R1, R3) return the values 2 and 1, respectively.
C0 C1
W0 x = 1
Wdb0 z = VA x → PA a
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
R1 y = 2
Rptw1 v = VA y → PA b
W2 y = 2
Wdb2 v = VA y → PA b
Rptw2 v = VA y → PA b
R3 x = 1
Rptw3 z = VA x → PA a
po po
rf
rf ptw
rf ptw
rf rf
rfrf
rf
rf ptw
rf ptw
(b) sb mapped to an ELT where the outcome remains permitted.
C0 C1
W0 x = 1
Wdb0 z = VA x → PA a
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
INVLPG1 y
R2 y = 2
Rptw2 v = VA y → PA a
WPTE3 v = VA y → PA a
INVLPG4 y
W5 y = 2
Wdb5 v = VA y → PA a
Rptw5 v = VA y → PA a
R6 x = 1
Rptw6 z = VA x → PA a
po
po
po
po
rf
rf ptw
rf ptw rf
rf
rf
rf
rf
rf ptw
rf ptw
po
remap
remap
rf pa
rf pa
co
co
co
fr
fr
(c) sb mapped to an ELT where the outcome is now forbidden due
to VAs x and y aliasing to the same PA a.
Fig. 2: (a) illustrates a sequentially consistent execution of the
sb litmus test using traditional MCM annotations. (b) and (c)
show two possible mappings of sb to ELTs using annotations
representative of our new MTM vocabulary. User-facing in-
structions are highlighted in yellow.
buffering (sb) litmus test in Fig. 2a, Event = {W0, R1, W2, R3}
and Location = {x, y}. MemoryEvent is a subset of Event,
containing only micro-ops that access memory (e.g., via
reading or writing it). In Fig. 2a, all elements of Event are
also elements of MemoryEvent. MemoryEvent can be further
divided into Read and Write subsets that contain micro-ops
that read and write memory, respectively. Each MemoryEvent
element is related to exactly one Location element by
the address relation. In this paper’s litmus test examples,
the notation <mem op> <addr> = <data> indicates that
mem op is related to addr by the address relation. In Fig. 2a,
address = {(W0, x), (R1, y), (W2, y), (R3, x)}.
Relations can be denoted as labels (e.g., address encodes
a labeling of MemoryEvents with Locations) or directed
edges in program execution graphs. Directed edges indicate
sequencing relationships between Events. We describe some
baseline MCM “edge relations” here noting that others may
be derived from this baseline set as needed. Events that are
sequenced in program order are related by the po relation. In
Fig. 2a, earlier instructions are related to subsequent same-
thread instructions by po, denoted by directed po edges.
Additionally, MemoryEvents that access the same memory
location can be related by the reads-from (rf), coherence-
order (co), or from-reads (fr) relations. rf relates Writes to
Reads that they source; co relates Writes to other Writes
that come later in coherence order (i.e., co is a total order on
same-address Writes); and fr relates Reads to Writes that
are co-successors of the Write they read from. We refer to
the union of rf, co, and fr as communication (com) relations.
A given set of Event and Location elements along with
a set of address and po relations defines a program. Adding
com relations (which distinguish different executions of the
same program) defines a candidate execution—i.e., a possible
dynamic sequencing of program memory references and other
MCM-relevant operations (e.g., synchronization operations
like fences/barriers). A litmus test, as in Fig. 2a, depicts a
candidate execution. In essence, com relations encode final
outcomes of litmus test programs, where an outcome consists
of the values returned by program Reads and the final state
of memory. TransForm represents all stored values (and thus
outcomes of candidate executions) symbolically. However, the
examples in this paper feature concrete values for pedagogy.
An MCM specification defines a consistency predicate that
renders candidate executions consistent or inconsistent with
respect to the specification. For example, the total store order
(TSO) MCM used by Intel x86 [23] processors, known as
x86-TSO, is defined by a consistency predicate that is com-
posed of the conjunction of three axioms (i.e., predicates that
must evaluate to True): sc per loc, rmw atomicity, and
causality [3]. These are defined as follows:
1) sc per loc: The set {rf+co+fr+po loc} of edges,
where + indicates disjunction, is acyclic. po loc is the
subset of ∧po that relates same-address MemoryEvents,
where ∧ is the transitive closure operator.
2) rmw atomicity: There are no intervening same-address
Writes between the Read and Write of a read-modify-
write (RMW) operation. In other words, fr.co does not
intersect with rmw, where relation rmw relates the Read
of an RMW to its corresponding Write, and where . is
the join operator.
3) causality: The set {rfe + co + fr + ppo + fence}
of edges is acyclic. Preserved program order (ppo)
corresponds to a subset of ∧po where the sequencing
order denoted by ∧po must be maintained by the architec-
ture. fence relates Events whose ordering is explicitly
architecturally-enforced by the presence of fence or bar-
rier Events. Reads-from external (rfe) is the subset of
rf that relates Events on different threads.
B. Limitations of Current ISA Memory Models
While MCMs of today’s commercial hardware [5, 6, 8, 20,
21, 23, 40, 55] are fundamental for precisely specifying the
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legal ordering and visibility of shared memory accesses in a
parallel program, there are ways in which they are insuffi-
cient. Central to our work, ISA memory and synchronization
operations that are fetched, decoded, and issued as part of
the user-level instruction stream are not the only operations
that may affect the outcome of a user-level program. Thus,
our work encompasses typical consistency features as well as
transistency features. In particular, our work on MTMs addi-
tionally captures shared memory interactions between user-
level instructions and transistency operations (i.e., system-
level and hardware-level operations). The system-level opera-
tions (i.e., support instructions3) we consider include address
remappings and TLB invalidations initiated by system calls.
The hardware-level operations (i.e., ghost instructions [29]) we
consider include hardware page table walks (PT walks) and
dirty bit updates. Furthermore, our work supports modeling of
MTM-specific shared memory interactions by expanding the
notion of “data” from MCMs beyond program variables to
also include transistency-specific data (i.e., transistency state)
like page table dirty bits and VA-to-PA mappings themselves.
1) Transistency Impacts Program Executions: Fig. 2 mo-
tivates augmenting MCMs with transistency features. For the
MCMs of essentially all commercial processors, the litmus test
execution in Fig. 2a is perfectly legal. In fact, Fig. 2a features
a sequentially-consistent execution [27]. However, accounting
for transistency could render the litmus test execution illegal
if, for example, virtual addresses (VAs) x and y were to map
to the same physical address (PA).
Figs. 2b and 2c represent two possible ways in which
transistency features could affect the legality of the execution
of Fig. 2a. The program executions in these figures that are
enhanced with transistency features are ELTs [29]. Before
explaining these ELTs, we state some assumptions made in
the litmus tests we present. First, as is typical for litmus tests,
memory locations in ELTs are initialized at the start of the test.
Thus, a Read that is not involved in an rf relation reads from
the initial program state. In keeping with MCM convention,
program variables are initialized to 0 at the start of the test.
Furthermore, the ELTs we present assume the following initial
mappings in PTEs stored at VAs z and v: VA z: VA x → PA
a and VA v: VA y → PA b, respectively. Again, all shared
memory values are represented symbolically by TransForm
and concretely in our examples for pedagogy. Next, x, y, and
u are VAs and a, b, and c are PAs. Finally, per-core TLBs are
initially empty.
Fig. 2b features one possible result of augmenting Fig. 2a’s
execution with Events related to transistency. First, each user-
facing Write, W, invokes a ghost instruction, Wdb. Each Wdb
is a Write event that accesses a shared memory Location
containing the dirty bit in the PTE that corresponds to the
effective VA of the shared-memory Write that invoked it.
The causal relationship between the user-facing Writes and
their corresponding dirty bit Writes is denoted by matching
3Prior work encompasses TransForm’s support operations—address remap-
pings and TLB invalidations initiated by system calls—in coarser-grained
map-remap functions (MRFs) [48].
numerical subscripts (explained further in §III-A). Next, each
MemoryEvent invokes a PT walk ghost instruction to locate
the VA-to-PA mapping corresponding to its effective VA. The
mapping from Fig. 2a to Fig. 2b is an algorithmic translation
that expands user-level instructions to include ghost instruc-
tions executing on their behalf. The execution it represents
would be legal on essentially all commercial MCMs.
Fig. 2c shows another possible augmentation of Fig. 2a. In
this case, however, the resulting ELT now represents an illegal
execution on virtually all commercial processors. The illegal
behavior stems from a support operation, WPTE3, on Core 1
(C1) which modifies the VA-to-PA mapping stored at VA v and
results in VAs x and y aliasing the same PA a. WPTE operations
are Write events that result from address remapping system
calls made on behalf of the user-level program. Each WPTE
accesses a shared memory Location containing the VA-
to-PA mapping to be modified. The address remapping in
Fig. 2c results in the ELT featuring a coherence violation (i.e.,
a violation of sc per loc), thus rendering it illegal under
x86-TSO (defined in §II-A).
The ELTs in Fig. 2 illustrate that a candidate execution’s
legality cannot necessarily be determined solely by informa-
tion provided in traditional MCM litmus tests (as in Fig. 2a).
Events and relationships related to VM implementations must
be taken into account (as in ELTs) since they can impact the
correctness of interactions between user-level Events. A given
candidate execution (or ELT) is determined to be permitted
or forbidden for a given MTM by evaluating the candidate
execution against the MTMs transistency predicate.
2) A Need for Formal MTM Specifications: The prior work
that proposed ELTs additionally presented a transistency-aware
framework, called COATCheck, for specifying and verifying
microarchitectural MTM implementations [29]. COATCheck
facilitates the specification of hardware designs along with
their VM-relevant OS support in a way that is amenable to
analysis with formal techniques. However, COATCheck con-
ducts verification with respect to a user-provided suite of ELT
programs that have been hand-curated. Improving microarchi-
tectural MTM verification coverage to more thoroughly verify
correct execution of corner-case behaviors requires a way to
automatically and systematically generate relevant ELTs for a
given MTM. Formal specification of an ISA’s MTM is required
to serve as the basis for automated ELT synthesis.
Our work gives MTMs a formal semantics. TransForm offers
a language for formally specifying MTMs at the architectural-
level whereas COATCheck demonstrated the importance of
formal MTM verification at the microarchitectural-level. More
broadly, formally specifying an ISA’s MTM provides a precise
interface against which tools such as COATCheck can con-
duct verification of hardware implementations and programs
targeting those implementations, even extending to full proofs
of MTM correctness in the future [33].
III. TOWARDS AN MTM
Starting from §II-A’s baseline vocabulary for describing
MCMs axiomatically, we propose additional Events and
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C0
R0 x = 0
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
rf ptw
(a) User-facing Reads may also result in additional memory refer-
ences in the form of a PT walk operation (Rptw0).
C0
W0 x = 1
Wdb0 z = VA x → PA a
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
rf ptw
(b) Like the Read in (a), user-facing Writes may result in a PT
walk (Rptw0). Additionally, Writes trigger a dirty bit update (Wdb0)
corresponding to the PTE of the VA-to-PA mapping.
Fig. 3: ISA Read and Write instructions invoke additional
ghost instructions when executed on systems with VM. The
ghost instructions access the PTE stored at address z to update
the TLB or page table’s state.
relations that are essential for defining MTMs and synthesizing
ELTs. As we detail TransForm’s transistency vocabulary, we
reference Fig. 2 as a running example.
A. Hardware-Level Operations: Ghost Instructions
User-facing code can cause hardware to execute ghost
instructions, such as hardware PT walks, on behalf of a
memory access (i.e., MemoryEvent) [29]. Ghost instructions
are not fetched, decoded, or issued as part of the program
instruction stream. Rather, they are invoked on behalf of a
particular user-facing instruction in the pipeline. They interact
with user-facing instructions via the shared memory state that
they modify, such as PTE status bits and TLB entries.
Since ghost instructions are not fetched and issued like
user-facing instructions, they are not related to other Events
on the same thread by po. Instead, we define the ghost
relation to relate each user-facing instruction to the ghost
instruction(s) invoked on its behalf. In the ELT examples
in this paper, a ghost relation exists between a user-facing
instruction and a ghost instruction when both have matching
numerical subscripts. For example, Fig. 3a illustrates a single
ghost instruction, Rptw0, invoked by user-facing instruction
R0. We next describe the ghost instructions that TransForm
currently supports.
1) PT walks: MemoryEvents operate on effective VAs; that
is, they are specified to access data at a particular VA by
the address relation (§II-A). For each memory access to a
particular VA, the processor must use hardware and system
support to identify the corresponding PA and physical page.
If the address mapping needed by a user-facing MemoryEvent
is not already present in the issuing core’s TLB, a PT walker
traverses the system’s page tables to locate the mapping in
a PTE and load it into a TLB entry. As with data caches,
subsequent accesses to the same mapping can access this
mapping from the TLB until it is evicted. Thus, a PT walk
is not required for every memory access, but only those that
experience TLB misses. Many systems implement hardware
PT walkers for performance, which we assume here. (Our
grammar is applicable for software PT walks as well.)
Fig. 3 illustrates how TransForm models PT walks and their
effects on program behavior. In both subfigures, Rptw0 is a PT
walk that loads the address mapping for VA x stored at VA
z. PT walks (e.g., Rptw0) must populate a TLB entry before
user-facing instructions (e.g., R0 in Fig. 3a and W0 in Fig. 3b)
can use it. The rf ptw relation is introduced to model this
new type of rf relationship; it relates a PT walk that loads a
mapping into a TLB entry, to all user-facing MemoryEvents
that “read from” that specific TLB entry. rf ptw differs from
rf in that the Location accessed by the PT walk is an address
mapping, whereas the Location accessed by the user-facing
instruction is a data location.
Each PT walk can only be related to one user-facing
instruction with ghost (the one that triggered it), but it can be
related to several user-facing instructions with rf ptw (those
that use the TLB entry it created). MemoryEvents that are
(resp. are not) related to a PT walk operation with ghost
represent TLB misses (resp. hits). As discussed further in
§III-B2, the eviction of an address mapping from a TLB will
result in a TLB miss for that address mapping in a subsequent
memory access. Thus, a MemoryEvent that experiences a
TLB miss must invoke a PT walk to re-load the required
mapping back into the TLB. Referring back to Fig. 2a, each
MemoryEvent accesses a distinct VA and thus should invoke
its own PT walk. The sb ELTs in Figs. 2b and 2c feature these
PT walks and their relationship via rf ptw to the user-facing
MemoryEvents that invoke and “read from” them.
2) Dirty Bit Updates: When an instruction writes to a
memory address, the written data is typically propagated to the
cache before it is written back to a physical page in memory.
Thus, each PTE contains a dirty bit to indicate when the
physical page corresponding to that PTE has been modified
and therefore needs to be updated [23].
As with PT walks, ghost associates a dirty bit update
with the user-facing Write that caused it. Fig. 3b shows this
relation where Wdb0 is a dirty bit Write that accesses the dirty
bit in the PTE stored at VA z. The user-facing Write that
caused Wdb0, namely W0, shares the same numerical subscript.
Likewise, Figs. 2b and 2c both include dirty bit Writes related
by ghost to the highlighted user-facing Writes. Dirty bit
updates are typically performed as RMW operations [23].
However, TransForm models dirty bit updates as Write op-
erations. This is conservative in terms of event ordering, and
it reduces the number of instructions TransForm requires to
synthesize programs with Writes from three (user-facing
Write, dirty bit Read, dirty bit Write) to two (user-facing
Write, dirty bit Write). Furthermore, TransForm does not
explicitly model the OS updating of dirty bits for synonyms
(i.e., VAs that map the same PA as in Fig. 2c). We assume
the OS checks all synonym dirty bits before evicting (i.e.,
swapping out) pages. This assumption is common in non-
naive OSs including Linux and could be relaxed in future
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implementations of TransForm.
B. System-Level Operations: Support Instructions
Support instructions help coordinate software’s correct exe-
cution on hardware systems implementing VM. In particular,
an OS has the ability to modify VA-to-PA mappings or
invalidate TLB entries during a user-facing program’s exe-
cution. These Events impact the execution of user-facing
program instructions by, for example, influencing which PA
is ultimately accessed by a user-facing MemoryEvent.
User-level MCM relations are traditionally defined assum-
ing that each memory location accessed in a program is
either a unique PA or a unique VA with no synonyms.
Furthermore, user-level MCM relations do not support VA-
to-PA mapping changes during a program’s execution. Thus,
there is no existing MCM vocabulary for articulating which
PA is being accessed by a particular VA and by extension,
no vocabulary for modeling synonyms that can arise from
system-level Events. TransForm’s MTM vocabulary solves
both of these issues. First, TransForm enables expressing the
OS’s ability to alter VA-to-PA mappings via system calls by
introducing support instructions for writing to PTEs as a type
of Write event. TransForm thus supports com edges (§II-A)
that relate MemoryEvents with different effective VAs as long
as these VAs map to the same PA (i.e., com edges relate
same-PA MemoryEvents). Second, TransForm accounts for
the OS’s ability to alter TLB state by introducing a support
instruction for evicting specified address mappings from the
TLB (INVLPG), either as a result of a system call changing
the address mapping or spuriously.
1) VA-to-PA Remappings: MTMs support the potential
modification of VA-to-PA mappings (stored in PTEs) during
a program’s execution as a result of system calls. The impli-
cation of supporting address remappings is that we cannot as-
sume (as MCMs do) that a specific VA is mapped to a specific
PA throughout the entirety of a program’s execution. Thus,
TransForm provides new types of communication relations to
support reasoning about which PA is accessed by a given user-
facing MemoryEvent.
To support modeling and reasoning about the effects
of VA-to-PA remappings of user-level program behavior
(i.e., to deduce which interactions may take place between
MemoryEvents with different effective VAs, yet potentially
the same effective PA), we adapt the MCM com relations from
§II-A. TransForm’s adaptation of com edges results in four new
relations that are described as follows. As with program data,
TransForm represents PAs (and VAs) symbolically.
• rf pa: Relates a PTE Write of VA v → PA p to
MemoryEvents that access PA p via VA v.
• co pa: Relates PTE Writes of VA v → PA p and VA
v′ → PA p in a total order. In other words, co pa is a
total order on the creation of aliases to a particular PA p.
• fr pa: Relates a MemoryEvent that accesses PA p via
VA v to the co pa-successors of the PTE Write that it
“reads from” in rf pa.
C0
R0 x = 0
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
R1 y = 0
Rptw1 v = VA y → PA b
WPTE2 v = VA y → PA c
INVLPG3 y
R4 y = 0
Rptw4 v = VA y → PA c
WPTE5 z = VA x → PA c
INVLPG6 x
R7 x = 0
Rptw7 z = VA x → PA c
(a) ELT with two PTE Writes and several Reads that read from
various mappings, depending on their location in the program. Here
and throughout the paper, white cells represent user- or system-level
instructions while gray lines represent ghost instructions.
C0
R0 x = 0
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
R1 y = 0
Rptw1 v = VA y → PA b
WPTE2 v = VA y → PA c
INVLPG3 y
R4 y = 0
Rptw4 v = VA y → PA c
WPTE5 z = VA x → PA c
INVLPG6 x
R7 x = 0
Rptw7 z = VA x → PA c
po
po
po
popo
po
po
rf
rf
fr
fr
rf ptw
rf ptw
rf ptw
rf ptw
remap
remap
rf pa
rf pa
fr pa
co pa
fr va
fr va
(b) ELT execution corresponding to (a), illustrating address mapping
changes and resulting pa edges.
Fig. 4: Example usage of each of the new pa edges (§III-B1).
VAs x and y are accessed before and after their mappings are
changed to alias to the same PA.
• fr va: Relates a MemoryEvent that accesses PA p via
VA v to the co-successors of the PTE Write that it “reads
from” in rf pa.
The relations above are used by TransForm to derive com edges
that relate MemoryEvents accessing the same PA but different
VAs (§II-A). Notably, rf va and co va are not included in
the above list. This is because rf va and co va are already
captured by rf pa and co, respectively.
Fig. 4a shows a program in which several user-facing Reads
access either VA x or y. Two PTE Write instructions, WPTE2
and WPTE5, invoked by system calls remap both x and y to a
new PA c. WPTE2 and WPTE5 then invoke invalidations INVLPG3
and INVLPG6 (respectively) of the TLB entries corresponding
to their remapped VAs to prevent stale mapping accesses.
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C0
R0 x = 0
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
R1 x = 0
po
rf ptw
rf ptw
(a) An address mapping brought
into a TLB by a PT walk can
source many same-thread instruc-
tions.
C0
R0 x = 0
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
INVLPG1 x
R2 x = 0
Rptw2 z = VA x → PA a
po
rf ptw
po
rf ptw
(b) A new PT walk is needed
when INVLPG evicts a TLB entry.
Fig. 5: An INVLPG inserted between Reads accessing the same
VA enforces reloading of the TLB entry via a PT walk.
Fig. 4b illustrates how these remapping operations relate to
each other and to the user-facing program instructions using
the pa edges described above.
System-level PTE Writes via system calls can fundamen-
tally change legality of particular MCM litmus test outcomes,
as Fig. 2c shows. Here, WPTE3 changes the mapping of VA y to
PA a so that VAs x and y map to the same PA. WPTE3 is related
to R2 and W5 via rf pa, indicating that R2 and W5 read from
WPTE3’s new address mapping and thus access the same PA
as W0 and R6. As a result, this particular candidate execution
features an illegal coherence violation, as described in §II-B.
2) TLB Entry Evictions: §III-A1 discussed how TLB state
can be modified via PT Walks. Here, we discuss how Trans-
Form handles TLB state modifications that result from TLB
evictions. TLB entries can be evicted for several reasons such
as 1) a change in the corresponding PTE, 2) a spurious eviction
by the OS, or 3) a TLB capacity eviction. We address each of
these scenarios in the following paragraphs.
First, on multicore systems, when address mappings are
modified, they must be invalidated in the TLBs of all cores
caching this mapping, not just the core performing the map-
ping change. The mechanism used to invoke these page inval-
idations on each core varies by architecture [12]. TransForm
models this TLB entry invalidation using an IPI in the form
of an INVLPG instruction [23]—named for an instruction in
the x86 ISA, but similar operations exist in other ISAs as
well—related to a PTE Write via a remap relation. remap
relates a PTE Write to corresponding INVLPGs on each
core that invalidate the TLB entries rendered stale by the
PTE Write (as in Fig. 4). For example, in Fig. 2c, WPTE3
(on C1) invokes INVLPGs, INVLPG1 and INVLPG4, on C0
and C1, respectively (as denoted by the remap relation), to
invalidate the appropriate TLB entries due to the address
mapping change. All memory accesses to a VA affected by an
INVLPG must read from the latest address mapping. In Fig. 2c,
R2 and W5 read from the new mapping of VA y and access
PA a. Currently, INVLPG is the only type of IPI modeled by
TransForm. However, support for additional IPIs is possible
in future TransForm extensions.
Second, the OS can initiate TLB evictions even when a PTE
has not been modified by a system call (e.g., by spuriously
invoking INVLPG instructions). When an INVLPG is invoked
by the OS and the corresponding PTE has not changed,
TransFrom does not instantiate a remap edge. MemoryEvents
following these spurious INVLPGs can read from the un-
changed PTE mapping but must bring the mapping back into
the TLB with a PT walk. Fig. 5a illustrates two Reads,
R0 and R1, to VA x that use the mapping brought into
the TLB by the same PT walk, Rptw0. In Fig. 5b, there is
an intervening page invalidation, INVLPG1, between the two
Reads to VA x so the second Read, R2, invokes a new PT
walk, Rptw2, to bring the previously evicted mapping back
into the TLB. When synthesizing ELT candidate executions
with TransForm’s synthesis engine, spurious INVLPGs are only
inserted on threads if they can affect the thread’s execution.
Finally, TLB capacity evictions occur when a TLB entry
must be evicted to make room for a new entry. (This could
occur due to capacity or conflict effects.) TransForm models
these evictions with the invocation of a PT walk by a user-
facing MemoryEvent. As explained in §III-A1, the loading of
a TLB entry by a PT walk indicates that there was a TLB miss.
A TLB miss occurs when 1) the address mapping is first being
used, 2) the entry is evicted by the OS (i.e., using INVLPG),
or 3) there is a TLB capacity eviction. Thus, when ELTs
feature PT walks that are not accessing an address mapping
for the first time (i.e., prior PT walks have been issued for
this mapping) and simultaneously do not feature OS evictions
of the address mapping from the TLB (i.e., INVLPG has not
been called for this address mapping), then the PT walk is
caused by a TLB capacity eviction. In TransForm’s automatic
synthesis, it explores all three of these possibilities for TLB
events.
C. Simplifying Assumptions in ELTs
Compared to MCM litmus tests, the presence of additional
operations, relevant state, and shared memory interactions
in ELTs mean that ELTs can become significantly larger
(by instruction count) and more complex (by the number
of potential interactions between ELT operations). Therefore,
the ELTs considered in this paper feature some simplifying
assumptions enumerated below. These assumptions do not
sacrifice the generality of our approach, but they do result in
improved performance when ELTs are analyzed or synthesized
using TransForm (e.g., in §VI).
1) Each thread of an ELT is assumed to execute on a distinct
processor core. Therefore, each thread has access to pri-
vate storage, including a private TLB. While TransForm
can support hyperthreading, the ELTs we consider in this
paper represent individual multi-threaded processes as is
common practice in MCM analysis.
2) Prior to the execution of an ELT, it is assumed that each
VA maps to a unique PA. Without this assumption, a PTE
Write, along with corresponding INVLPGs, would need
to be explicitly modeled and included in the ELT for
each VA accessed in the program to appropriately derive
which corresponding PAs are accessed. These additional
7
MTM
elements Descriptions
Event instruction representing a micro-op in a program
MemoryEvent Read or Write memory access in a program
address relates MemoryEvent to Location being accessed
po program order, same-thread sequencing of Events
rf relates Write to Reads it sources
co relates Write to other Writes in coherence order
fr relates Read to co-successors of Write it reads from
ghost
relates user-facing MemoryEvent to induced ghost
instructions
rf ptw
relates PT walk to user-facing MemoryEvents that
read from loaded TLB entry
rf pa
relates PTE Write to user-facing MemoryEvents
that access written address mapping
co pa
relates PTE Write to other subsequent PTE Writes
for same PA in coherence order
fr pa
relates user-facing MemoryEvent to co pa-successors
of PTE Write they read address mapping from
fr va
relates user-facing MemoryEvent to subsequent PTE
Write that changes address mapping for accessed VA
remap relates PTE Write to invoked INVLPGs
TABLE I: Summary of MTM vocabulary. The elements in
gray are baseline MCM elements that TransForm builds on.
instructions would unnecessarily degrade performance of
ELT synthesis with TransForm.
3) We do not model recursive page tables. Stemming from
this design choice, we do not model ghost instructions for
PTE Writes. In reality, PTE Writes modify some VA
whose mapping to a PA is stored in another PTE. The
process for finding address translations in these higher
levels of page tables is very similar to finding them for
the base case that we model.
D. Illustrative Example of Vocabulary Usage
Table I summarizes TransForm’s MTM vocabulary. This
section illustrates how TransForm’s MTM vocabulary can be
used to reason about observable program behaviors in a more
complex ELT example than the running example of Fig. 2.
Consider the ELT in Fig. 6. Fig. 6a features an MCM litmus
test consisting of four user-facing instructions and one support
instruction (induced by a system call), WPTE1. As Fig. 6b
shows, using only MCM relations results in ambiguity as to
which Write, W2 or W3, R4 is reading from. Although reading
from either Write constitutes a valid program execution for
x86-TSO, the ambiguity can be cleared up with MTM relations.
Fig. 6c extends Fig. 6a to one possible ELT formulation
(illustrated with MTM relations in Fig. 6d) as follows. First,
Fig. 6b is augmented with system-level INVLPGs that are
invoked via OS-issued IPIs on each core. Fig. 6d shows
INVLPG2 and INVLPG5 related to WPTE1 via remap relations.
Second, ghost instructions are added for each user-facing
MemoryEvent (R0, W3, W4, and R6). Since INVLPG2 and
INVLPG5 evict the TLB entries loaded by Rptw0 and Rptw4,
Rptw3 and Rptw6 bring updated address mappings for VA x into
the TLB that are accessed by W3 and R6, respectively. Third,
the inserted ghost instructions result in the addition of the
appropriate pa and va relations (§III-B1). Since W3 and R6
access the mapping for VA x written by WPTE1, there are rf pa
C0 C1
R0 x = 0 W3 x = 1
WPTE1 z = VA x → PA b R4 x = 1
W2 x = 1
(a) A user-level test in which a Read (R0) reads 0 at VA x and the
address mapping for x is changed. R4 reads a 1 at address x.
C0 C1
R0 x = 0
WPTE1 z = VA x → PA b
W2 x = 1
W3 x = 1
R4 x = 1
po
po
po
fr
rf?
rf?
(b) Mapping of (a) showing an ambiguous data access by R4.
C0 C1
R0 x = 0 W4 x = 1
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a Wdb4 z = VA x → PA a
WPTE1 z = VA x → PA b Rptw4 z = VA x → PA a
INVLPG2 x INVLPG5 x
W3 x = 1 R6 x = 1
Wdb3 z = VA x → PA b Rptw6 z = VA x → PA b
Rptw3 z = VA x → PA b
(c) A possible ELT for the program in (a).
C0 C1
R0 x = 0
Rptw0 z = VA x → PA a
WPTE1 z = VA x → PA b
INVLPG2 x
W3 x = 1
Wdb3 z = VA x → PA b
Rptw3 z = VA x → PA b
W4 x = 1
Wdb4 z = VA x → PA a
Rptw4 z = VA x → PA a
INVLPG5 x
R6 x = 1
Rptw6 z = VA x → PA b
po
po
po
po
po
rf
rf
rf
rf
fr
fr
fr
co
co
rf ptw
rf ptw
rf ptw
rf ptw
remap
remap
rf pa
rf pa
fr va
fr va
(d) ELT illustrating the program in (c).
Fig. 6: The program in (a) results in an ambiguous MCM
relation mapping in (b). The ELT in (c) and (d) presents a
transistency view of a possible candidate execution.
edges relating each to WPTE1. Similarly, R0 and W4 read from
the initial address mapping for VA x so there are fr va edges
relating them to WPTE1. Fourth (and finally), based on the pa
and va relations, the effective PAs that are accessed by each
MemoryEvent can be derived and appropriate com edges can
be added to the ELT. It is now clear that R6 reads from W3 in
this particular execution (due to the rf relation between them)
while W4 accesses a different PA.
As this section’s examples show, Table I’s proposed MTM
vocabulary facilitates modeling of transistency Events that
encompass consistency issues well beyond traditional MCMs.
We next use this vocabulary to automate ELT synthesis.
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Fig. 7: TransForm’s synthesis engine uses MTM vocabulary from Table I to axiomatically define the inputted MTM and
synthesize candidate executions in Alloy which are pruned and deduplicated to find unique, interesting ELT programs. Relation
placement and relaxation rules are implicit inputs that are defined to apply broadly across systems.
IV. AUTOMATING ELT SYNTHESIS
TransForm features a synthesis engine for automatically
generating a suite of ELTs from a formal, axiomatic MTM
specification supplied using Table I’s vocabulary. As shown
in Fig. 7, TransForm’s synthesis engine performs bounded
ELT synthesis in conceptually three main steps elaborated in
the subsections below. First, TransForm synthesizes the set of
all possible ELT executions up to a user-specified instruction
bound. Second, this set of candidate executions is pruned
based on which executions feature interesting transistency be-
haviors. Finally, the subset of interesting candidate executions
are deduplicated to output a suite of unique (and interesting)
ELT programs.
A. Candidate Execution Synthesis
Synthesizing candidate ELT executions based on our formal
MTM vocabulary requires axioms (i.e., rules defined in terms
of our vocabulary) that articulate what a valid ELT looks like.
Synthesizing traditional MCM litmus tests requires relatively
few axioms to describe a legal program execution. For exam-
ple, consider the MCM features that uniquely define a MCM
candidate execution: Event, address, po, rf, co, and fr.
One axiom might state that po must be acyclic in any valid
program execution. Another might state that co must represent
a total order. To summarize, MCM litmus tests have virtually
no constraints on which Locations can be related to which
MemoryEvents via the address relation, where individual
Events can be placed within a program thread, and which
(same-address) instructions can interact via com relations. As
shown in Fig. 7, TransForm performs synthesis based on the
axioms provided to specify the MTM, as well as a set of
placement rules that guide synthesis regarding how operations,
such as ghost instructions, can be placed and inserted.
With TransForm’s augmented MTM vocabulary (Table I),
synthesizing candidate ELTs requires a more complex set of
axioms to describe a legal program execution. For example,
com edges must relate MemoryEvents accessing the same PA.
PTE Writes must induce INVLPGs on each core. Likewise,
when a program features an INVLPG, a MemoryEvent follow-
ing that INVLPG in ∧po that accesses the address mapping
evicted from the local TLB by the INVLPG must reload the
mapping back into the TLB with a PT walk. Moreover, as
C0 C1 C2
W0 x = 1 R2 y = 1 W4 u = 1
W1 y = 1 R3 x = 0
(a) A litmus test with Writes on C0 and Reads on C1 to addresses
x and y. There is also a Write on C2 to address u.
C0 C1 C2
W0 x = 1
W1 y = 1
R2 y = 1
R3 x = 0
W4 u = 1
po po
rf
fr
(b) Mapping of the program from (a). There is a cycle formed by the
po, rf, and fr edges on C0 and C1.
Fig. 8: This candidate execution violates x86-TSO axioms
described in §II-A, and therefore would be included in the
vector space of interesting ELTs. However, it does not satisfy
the minimality criterion; removing the Write (W4) would not
make this program satisfiable under x86-TSO, even though
removing any of the remaining Events would. Because it is
not minimal, TransForm would not synthesize this ELT.
described in §III-A, ghost instructions and their corresponding
relations (ghost and rf ptw) have very specific rules that
dictate their legal behavior in a candidate execution.
Given rules for describing legal ELT formulations (as dis-
cussed in Section III), TransForm can synthesize all conceiv-
able ELTs up to a user-specified bound on the number of
program instructions. The following sections describe how this
set of tests is pruned down to a minimal and interesting subset.
B. Spanning Set Pruning
TransForm’s synthesis engine defines and generates a span-
ning set of ELTs. In linear algebra, every vector in a vector
space V can be written as a linear combination of the vectors
in the spanning set S. In our work, TransForm synthesizes a
spanning set S of ELTs where the space of all relevant MTM
behaviors (that are realizable up to a user-provided instruction
bound) can be captured by the ELTs in S.
TransForm requires the following criteria for inclusion of
ELTs in the vector space of relevant (i.e., interesting) MTM
behaviors. First, an ELT must contain at least one Write.
This requirement enables multiple possible outcomes (i.e.,
executions) for the ELT. Second, an ELT must be able to
produce an outcome that can violate the transistency predicate
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of the user-provided MTM. This rule ensures that synthesized
ELTs have the potential to expose forbidden MTM behaviors
when used for verification and validation.
After pruning the set of all legal candidate ELTs to produce
only those that belong in our vector space of interesting MTM
behaviors, ELTs are evaluated for inclusion in our spanning
set based on a minimality criterion. Minimality requires an
ELT execution to have a forbidden outcome that becomes legal
(according to the transistency predicate) under every possible
isolated relaxation of the ELT program [30]. For TransForm’s
synthesis engine, Fig. 7 depicts relaxation rules as an implicit
input to the synthesis pruning stage. A relaxation corresponds
to the removal of an Event (or group of Events as described
below) or dependency4 in the ELT. Relaxations are applied to
each candidate ELT in the vector space to determine whether
it satisfies the minimality criterion. Fig. 8 shows a simplified
example of a candidate ELT with only user-facing Events
presented that would not meet the minimality criterion.
The most common relaxation performed by TransForm’s
synthesis engine when evaluating minimality is the removal of
an Event. Conceptually, this relaxation is intended to remove
just a single isolated event. However, the removal of some
Events from an ELT may render the ELT invalid. For exam-
ple, ghost instructions are not permitted to exist in an ELT if
they do not correspond to some user-facing MemoryEvent that
invokes them. Alternately, some user-facing MemoryEvents
require the invocation of particular ghost instructions. Due to
these requirements, when performing a relaxation intended to
remove a single Event TransForm removes additional Events
to maintain legality of the ELT. For example, TransForm
permits the removal of a ghost instruction if and only if
its corresponding user-facing MemoryEvent is itself removed.
Likewise, INVLPGs that are invoked by a system-level PTE
Write can only be removed if and only if the PTE Write
itself is also removed. Spurious INVLPGs that are not a result
of PTE changes, however, are free to be removed in isolation.
Unlike the restricted relaxations in this work, user-level MCM
litmus test synthesis from prior work permitted relaxations that
remove any arbitrary Event from a litmus test in isolation [30].
C. Alloy Implementation and Unique ELT Pruning
We use the Alloy relational modeling domain-specific lan-
guage (DSL), specifically Alloy 4.2 [25], to encode axiomatic
MTMs written in TransForm’s vocabulary and to implement
the synthesis engine described in this section. Alloy’s rela-
tional model-finding backend, Kodkod [52], enables us to
transform the ELT synthesis problem into a SAT problem
to be fed to any off-the-shelf SAT solver; our experiments
use the MiniSat SAT solver [17]. Once TransForm’s synthesis
engine determines which ELTs are eligible for inclusion in
the spanning set, Alloy outputs them in XML form. XML
ELTs are post-processed using a deduplication engine built on
prior work to return a set of unique ELT programs [30]. Our
4In our evaluation we only consider rmw dependencies, which are modeled
as relations that relate the Read and Write of an RMW operation.
experiments synthesize ELTs via the process in Fig. 7 up to
our provided instruction count bounds.
V. CASE STUDY: X86 MTM
This section uses Table I’s axiomatic vocabulary to define
and develop an MTM, x86t elt, that estimates the MTM of
Intel x86 processors, based on a range of public information
and analysis from prior work [23, 29]. Then, TransForm’s
synthesis engine automatically generates the suite of ELTs that
encode the spanning set of x86t elt’s MTM behaviors.
A. Defining x86t elt
As with the consistency predicate for x86-TSO, the transis-
tency predicate for x86t elt consists of the conjunction of
several axioms. Since transistency is a superset of consistency,
the axioms that comprise the x86t elt transistency predicate
include, as a subset, the axioms that comprise the x86-TSO
consistency predicate (§II-A) [3]. We identify and evaluate two
additional x86t elt transistency axioms, listed below. The
first axiom (invlpg) is required for capturing software-visible
effects of x86 transistency implementations, while the second
(tlb causality) is a “diagnostic” axiom to aid hardware
designers in localizing transistency bugs caused by incorrect
TLB implementations.
1) invlpg: The set {fr va+ ∧po+ remap} of edges must
be acyclic.
2) tlb causality: The set {ptw source+ com} of edges
must be acyclic.
The remainder of this section describes the derivation of
these MTM axioms. From analysis of public x86 documen-
tation and prior work [23, 29], we identify forbidden MTM
behaviors and use TransForm’s vocabulary to define axioms
that prevent them.
1) invlpg: invlpg enforces that a MemoryEvent e must
read from the latest VA-to-PA mapping associated with its
effective VA when it follows an INVLPG i in ∧po and both
e and i access the same VA. MemoryEvents can only access
PA p via VA v as long as this address mapping remains intact
in their local TLB. If a system call remaps VA v to some PA
p′ with a PTE Write and invokes INVLPGs (represented with
remap relations) on each core, the previous mapping of VA
v to PA p is rendered invalid for MemoryEvents following
the INVLPGs in ∧po. The relation fr va is an architecturally-
enforced ordering that relates a user-facing MemoryEvent to
PTE Writes that remap its effective VA to a new PA. remap
represents an architecturally-enforced ordering between a PTE
Write and the INVLPGs it invokes. Furthermore, it is enforced
architecturally that a MemoryEvent that accesses a TLB entry
that was evicted by an INVLPG occurring earlier in ∧po cannot
access an “old” address mapping. More specifically, x86t elt
enforces that some MemoryEvent e following some INVLPG i
in ∧po (where both access the same VA) must access a VA-to-
PA mapping that is a co-successor of the mapping invalidated
by i. Thus, we require acyclicity of the union of fr va,
remap, and ∧po.
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2) tlb causality: tlb causality prevents a causal
relationship between some MemoryEvent e′ and some other
MemoryEvent e whose corresponding PT walk sourced the
TLB entry accessed by e′. Since MemoryEvents locate VA-to-
PA mappings in the TLB of their local core, rf ptw represents
an architecturally-enforced ordering between a MemoryEvent
and the PT walk that populates the TLB entry it accesses.
Furthermore, our x86t elt model assumes an architecturally-
enforced ordering between the user-facing MemoryEvent that
invokes (i.e., is related by ghost to) a PT walk and other
user-facing MemoryEvents (on the same core) that access
the TLB entry populated by this PT walk. To represent this
ordering relationship, we derive ptw source to relate a user-
facing MemoryEvent that invokes a PT walk to all other user-
facing MemoryEvents that are related to this PT walk by
rf ptw. Thus, some MemoryEvent e′ that is ordered after
some other MemoryEvent e in ptw source cannot be related
to MemoryEvent e by a causal communication relationship.
As noted above, we include tlb causality in x86t elt
for the purpose of diagnosing hardware bugs in TLB im-
plementations. In particular, the architecturally-visible ef-
fects of tlb causality violations are already subsumed
by violations of another x86t elt axiom, specifically
causality (hence the naming convention). However, includ-
ing tlb causality enables TransForm to specifically iden-
tify which ELTs may be used by hardware verification engi-
neers to localize transistency bugs to incorrectly implemented
TLBs. Of the 140 unique ELTs that TransForm synthesizes
for x86t elt (§VI), five can be attributed to violations of
tlb causality.
B. Synthesis Approach
Given x86t elt as defined in §V-A as input, TransForm’s
synthesis engine generates a suite of ELT programs. The syn-
thesized ELTs must constitute a forbidden program execution
(according to the x86t elt transistency predicate in this case)
that becomes permitted under every possible relaxation. To
synthesize ELTs that can result in forbidden outcomes, we
identify (in turn) each of the axioms that comprise x86t elt
(i.e., sc per loc, rmw atomicity, causality, invlpg,
tlb causality) as an axiom to be violated (and thus render
the synthesized ELT executions forbidden). Synthesizing an
ELT that violates one of these axioms directly corresponds to
synthesizing a forbidden ELT execution.
We synthesize five ELT suites, each containing tests that
correspond to violations of one of the five x86t elt axioms,
for increasing instruction bounds under a one week timeout
period. Each suite requires a minimum instruction bound of 4
instructions or higher, depending on the number of instructions
needed to form interactions that can violate the respective
axiom and constitute the test a part of the spanning set. Thus,
synthesis begins at 4 instructions and increases until timeout.
VI. RESULTS5
5This is an updated version of the TransForm paper that features updated
results reflecting performance optimizations and software bug fixes.
We supplied our x86t elt MTM (from §V) consisting of
five high-level axioms to TransForm’s synthesis engine. We
evaluated TransForm’s ability to synthesize spanning sets of
ELTs for x86t elt with increasing instruction counts for
a one week timeout period. For each axiom, we found the
minimum required instruction bound that results in synthesized
ELTs—between four and seven instructions for the axioms
shown here—and incrementally increased this bound until
synthesis did not terminate in one week’s time. The resulting
synthesized ELTs for each axiom are collected into a set
referred to as a “per-axiom suite.” The rest of this section
details our synthesis observations, compares the TransForm-
generated ELTs to a baseline (the hand-generated COATCheck
ELT suite [29]), and gives examples of synthesized ELTs.
A. Overview of Synthesized Suite
Fig. 9a summarizes the number of ELT programs synthe-
sized in each per-axiom suite, at varying instruction bounds.
Fig. 9b shows the corresponding execution time required
to synthesize them. Instruction bounds with no data points
were either too restrictive to synthesize ELTs satisfying our
spanning set criteria (i.e., fewer than 4 instructions) or too
permissive (resulting in a large search space) for synthesis to
complete within one week. Variability among our evaluated
axioms results in variable minimal instruction bounds to
produce non-empty ELT spanning sets and variable synthesis
runtimes.
Over one hundred ELTs are generated automatically. At
each instruction bound, the sc per loc suite makes up the
largest component of the full synthesized suite. This is in part
because the sc per loc axiom specifies ordering constraints
on all types of instructions that TransForm models (i.e., user-
facing, support, and ghost). This translates into more possibil-
ities for violating this axiom, therefore more ELTs that qualify
as interesting based on our criteria for vector space inclusion
(in §IV-B). Prior automated MCM litmus test synthesis [30]
resulted in the sc per loc suite saturating at 10 tests for the
x86-TSO MCM. Because of the richer interactions in MTMs,
many more tests are generated in our corresponding synthesis
runs here for x86t elt. Overall, the value of TransForm’s
ELT synthesis is two-fold. First, the automatic synthesis of
hundreds of minimal and interesting MTM ELTs offers huge
support for systems programmers and transistency verifiers.
Second, the methodology rests on a foundational definition of
completeness up to the specified synthesis bounds; this gives
designers a clear understanding of the comprehensiveness of
their verification approach.
The TransForm synthesis approach generates a complete
suite of ELTs, composed of per-axiom suites at varying
synthesis bounds, for the provided one week timeout bound.
B. Comparison Against Prior Work
For reference, we compare our TransForm-synthesized ELT
suite for x86t elt with a handwritten suite of 40 ELTs from
prior work [29]. Of the original 40, 22 ELTs are relevant for
comparison. Of the other 18, 9 deal with particular IPIs that
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(a) Plot of the number of ELTs synthesized in each suite by instruction
bound. The first point for each type of suite corresponds to the
minimum instructions required to synthesize that type of suite.
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(b) Plot of the runtimes for synthesizing each suite by instruction
bound. Runtimes increase monotonically with instruction bound, with
the exception of the rmw atomicity suite which resulted in non-
monotonic runtime behavior when bounds were increased past 11
instructions. For these runs, the same ELTs were synthesized so
this non-monotonicity likely occurred due to the inherent variability
and noise present during synthesis. Although runtimes grow super-
exponentially with instruction bound, our ELT optimizations (§III)
and symmetry reduction enable synthesis for 10-instruction bounds
and higher to result in over 100 useful ELTs within practical
runtimes. We believe future work on symmetry reductions and other
optimizations can further accelerate these synthesis times.
Fig. 9: Statistics on our synthesized ELTs. (a) plots the number
of instructions in each synthesized test suite while (b) plots
the runtimes for synthesizing each of them.
are not presently supported by TransForm, and 9 others do not
meet TransForm’s spanning set criteria for ELTs. In contrast,
TransForm synthesizes a total of 140 unique ELTs across all
per-axiom suites (for a one week synthesis timeout bound).
To facilitate comparison, we consider the 22 prior handwrit-
ten ELTs as two categories. First, there are ELTs which pass
the minimality criterion and would be synthesized verbatim by
TransForm (category 1). Second, there are ELTs which are not
minimal as-is but are a superset of a minimal ELT (category
2). The extraneous instructions in the latter set of ELTs can
be removed, exposing a minimal ELT that TransForm would
synthesize. We automate the ELT comparison process via a
tool that first checks if TransForm would synthesize the ELT
verbatim in the synthesized suite (category 1), and if not,
subsequently tests for the ELT’s inclusion in category 2 by
trying to remove subsets of instructions from the ELT to see
if it can be minimized to a TransForm-synthesizable test.
Seven of the 22 ELTs from the COATCheck suite fall into
the first category and are synthesized verbatim. These seven
ELTs match four synthesized ELT programs. Recall that our
tool outputs ELT programs whereas ELTs typically describe
programs and their outcomes (i.e., an ELT execution), so
some of our synthesized ELT programs might correspond to
more than one ELT execution from the COATCheck suite.
We additionally find 15 ELTs from the COATCheck suite that
fall into the second category. These ELTs can be reduced to
at least 1 minimal ELT which is synthesized by TransForm.
We consider such synthesized minimal ELTs to be unique
new ELTs, as they were not explicitly part of the handwritten
COATCheck suite. Thus, of the 140 ELTs synthesized by
TransForm, we find that all 22 ELTs from the COATCheck
suite either directly match 4 of the synthesized ELTs or derive
from one of the remaining 136 new synthesized ELTs.
C. Examples of Synthesized ELTs
Figs. 10a and 11 provide examples of synthesized ELTs.
Fig. 10a illustrates an ELT synthesized by TransForm and
an exact match to a category 1 example (ptwalk2) from
the COATCheck suite. The outcome shown violates both
sc per loc and invlpg so it is forbidden.
Fig. 10b illustrates a handwritten ELT from the COATCheck
suite. It is one of the 15 category 2 ELTs in our comparison,
meaning it is not minimal in its handwritten form. TransForm
automatically synthesizes a reduction of this ELT. Our com-
parison tool identifies a possible reduction (i.e., a subset of
extraneous instructions that can be removed, in this case {W3})
of this ELT that renders it minimal and synthesizable.
Fig. 11 illustrates an example of a new synthesized ELT
that is not found in the handwritten suite. In it, a system-level
PTE Write, WPTE0, is invoked by a system call, and remaps
VA x. WPTE0’s mapping update induces two INVLPGs: INVLPG1
and INVLPG2. INVLPG2 precedes R3 which reads from VA x.
This particular execution has a forbidden outcome because
even though R3 comes after INVLPG2 in po, it accesses a
stale address mapping, as indicated by fr va. This execution
violates invlpg since there is a resulting cycle in remap,
fr va, and ∧po, and is thus forbidden by x86t elt.
TransForm’s framework for specifying MTMs and automat-
ically synthesizing ELTs paves the way for systems program-
mers to perform deep verification and validation of MTM
implementations. In future work, we plan to use the syn-
thesized ELTs to empirically validate x86t elt against real-
world operating systems and x86 processor implementations.
VII. RELATED WORK
Formal MCM Specifications: From their earliest roots [27],
MCMs have been studied extensively over the years. Program-
12
C0
WPTE0 z = VA x → PA b
INVLPG1 x
R2 x = 0
Rptw2 z = VA x → PA a
po
po fr
rf ptw
remapfr va
(a) This figure illustrates the forbidden ptwalk2 ELT from the
COATCheck suite that TransForm synthesized.
C0
WPTE0 z = VA x → PA b
INVLPG1 x
R2 x = 0
Rptw2 z = VA x → PA b
W3 x = 1
Wdb3 z = VA x → PA b
Rptw3 z = VA x → PA b
po
po
po
fr
fr
rf
co
rf
rf ptw
rf ptw
remap
rf pa
rf pa
(b) This figure illustrates the permitted dirtybit3 ELT from the
COATCheck suite that can be reduced to a program that meets the
minimality criterion and can be synthesized by TransForm.
Fig. 10: (a) and (b) illustrate COATCheck ELTs that were
synthesized by TransForm either verbatim or by removing
extraneous instructions, respectively.
C0 C1
WPTE0 z = VA x → PA b
INVLPG1 x
INVLPG2 x
R3 x = 1
Rptw3 z = VA x → PA a
po pofr va
frremap
remap
rf ptw
Fig. 11: This figure illustrates a forbidden candidate execution
of a new synthesized ELT.
ming language-level MCMs have been formalized for Java,
C11, and OpenCL [9, 11, 13, 36, 39, 43, 56]. Additionally, for-
mal ISA-level MCM specifications exist for x86-TSO, Power,
ARMv7, ARMv8, RISC-V WMO and TSO, and NVIDIA
PTX [3, 38, 40, 41, 44, 55]. These MCM specification efforts
have given way to verified compiler mapping schemes from
C11 and Java MCM primitives to the x86, ARMv7, ARMv8,
and Power ISAs [10, 11, 26, 43, 49, 50, 54]. Recently, the
MCM for the Linux Kernel was also formalized [1]. Trans-
Form assists programmers and compiler writers in developing
correct system code for VM implementations by offering
specification and verification support.
Verification of Hardware MCM Implementations: Formal
ISA MCM specifications have prompted research on verifying
the correctness of hardware MCM implementations [28, 33–
35, 53]. Much of this prior work conducts bounded verification
for suites of MCM litmus tests [28, 34, 35, 53] while some
is proof-based [16, 33]. The COATCheck tool from this line
of work also proposed a mechanism for verifying MTM
implementations [29]. However, this work relied on hand-
crafted ELTs and did not formally describe them or an MTM
which could be used to generate them. In contrast, TransForm
can be used to generate ELTs for expanding coverage of
hardware MTM verification.
Expanding the Scope of Concurrency Specifications: A
variety of research efforts formally define concurrency speci-
fications beyond memory consistency. Crash consistency has
been proposed to describe ordering behaviors for file system
state updates across crashes [14]. Memory persistency has been
coined for reasoning about the order in which nonvolatile
memory writes persist to memory [42]. Recently, persistency
models have been formalized in the context of the release
consistency [24], x86-TSO [45], and ARMv8 [46] MCMs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
TransForm is a framework for formally specifying MTMs
and synthesizing ELTs to support systems programmers and
hardware designers verifying MTM behaviors. MTMs are
central for assuring correct consistency behavior in the face
of intricate VM interactions. TransForm includes a vocabulary
for formally specifying MTMs and an automated synthesis
approach for corresponding ELTs. To evaluate TransForm,
we used its vocabulary to specify x86t elt, an estimated
MTM for x86 processors. From this MTM, we used Trans-
Form to automatically synthesize its corresponding ELTs.
TransForms synthesis engine automatically produces a set of
ELTs including relevant hand-curated ELTs from prior work,
plus over 100 more. TransForm is open source and publicly
available at github.com/naorinh/TransForm.git. Overall, this
work showcases the value and potential impact TransForm
brings to MTM verification.
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